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Preserving Pendent Claims Subject to Special
Limitation Periods in Missouri after the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
Hill v. John Chezik Imports'
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)2
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 1986, Jill Hill was fired from her clerical job at the John
Chezik Honda dealership in St. Louis. The next day she filed sex discrimina-
tion charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
Missouri Human Rights Commission.3 Although Hill pursued those charges
through two administrative investigations and four subsequent judicial
proceedings, she never had the chance to present the substance of her
grievance to a court. Her federal and state discrimination claims were
ultimately barred by their respective statutes of limitation.4
Hill was two weeks late in filing her Title VII discrimination claim.
5
The federal trial and appellate courts refused to toll this claim's period of
limitation on equitable grounds,6 which would have excused her delay in
filing, and dismissed her pendent state-law claims for lack of diversity. Hill
then refiled those pendent claims (the discrimination claim and several tort
claims) in state court.7 Although the state-law discrimination claim had
expired, Hill requested that its limitation period be equitably tolled during the
time the federal suit was pending.8
The state trial and appellate courts, however, rejected her request as
contrary to established Missouri law.9 Consequently, this state-law claim also
1. 797 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) [hereinafter Hill 11].
2. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 5089, 5114 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(d)(2)).
3. Hill 11, 797 S.W.2d at 529.
4. Id. at 529-30.
5. Id. at 529.
6. Id. Equitable tolling is discussed infra notes 64-67
and accompanying text.
7. Hill 11, 797 S.W.2d at 529.
8. Id. at 530.
9. Id. at 530-31.
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was time barred although Hill had originally filed it on time in the federal
district court.10 The state courts additionally found that Hill's tort claims
against her employer were preempted by the Workers' Compensation Act."
After four years of litigation, Hill had established only the dubious right to
proceed with a single tort claim against a fellow employee.' 2 For all
practical purposes, she had lost her opportunity for meaningful redress.
Two months after Hill's discrimination claims were finally laid to rest,
Congress came to the rescue by enacting the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990." One section of the Act codifies the authority of federal courts to
hear pendent and ancillary claims, collectively termed "supplemental
jurisdiction."'4 This section also tolls the limitation period of supplemental
claims while they are pending in federal district court and for thirty days after
the claims are dismissed. 5 Thus, this tolling provision preserves expired
pendent claims like Hill's when a federal court declines to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction.
The catch is that in Missouri this provision is likely to be challenged as
an unconstitutional infringement on the state's power to determine the
jurisdiction of its own courts when it is applied to a claim governed by a
"special" statute of limitation, such as Hill's discrimination claim. Neverthe-
less, the tolling provision is likely to survive as a valid preemption of state
law. It is also likely to create certain unintended consequences for both
plaintiffs and federal courts sitting in Missouri.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 531.
12. Id.
13. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 310, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (104 Stat.) 5089, 5113-14.
14. "Supplemental jurisdiction" encompasses two mechanisms for bootstrapping
jurisdictionally insufficient claims into federal court, by joining them to a jurisdiction-
ally proper claim. "Pendent jurisdiction" allows a plaintiff to join a state-law claim,
which does not meet diversity requirements, to a related federal question claim arising
from the same facts. Pendent "claim" jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff brings both
a federal-law claim and a state-law claim against a single nondiverse defendant.
Pendent "party" jurisdiction occurs when the plaintiff's federal-law and state-law
claims are brought against two different nondiverse defendants as part of the same
action. "Ancillary jurisdiction" permits the joinder of jurisdictionally insufficient
claims by or against additional parties after the filing of plaintiff's (jurisdictionally
proper) complaint. See Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, Congress Accepts Supreme
Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 214
(1991).
15. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 310, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (104 Stat.) 5089, 5113-14.
1094 [Vol. 56
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PRESERVING PENDENT CLAIMS
This Comment explains why Missouri's limitation doctrine prevented
tolling the limitation period of Hill's state-law claim while it remained in
federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This is an issue of first impression
in the state. The Comment then explores the difficulties that are likely to




Jill E. Hill, a clerk at an automobile dealership operated by defendant
John Chezik Imports, was fired by her supervisor, defendant Dean Thanas, on
June 2, 1986.16 On June 3, 1986, she filed charges with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 17 and with the Missouri Human
Rights Commission (MHRC),' 8 claiming that during the fourteen months of
her employment she had been harassed repeatedly by Thanas and finally was
fired when she refused his sexual advances. Hill also alleged that John
Chezik Imports was aware of the situation but did not take corrective
action.' 9
The EEOC sent Hill a Right to Sue letter by certified mail on August 25,
1987.20 This letter was accepted at her old address on September 2, 1987,
but never reached her.21 At Hill's request, the EEOC mailed her a confirma-
tion letter on September 24th.2 On December 16, 1987, Hill filed suit
against John Chezik Imports and Thanas in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri.2? The suit contained a Title VII discrimination
claim and three pendent state-law claims alleging, respectively, employment
discrimination, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent retention of a dangerous employee.24
The lawsuit was filed 83 days after Hill received actual notice of her
right to sue from the EEOC, but 105 days after she received constructive
16. Hill 11, 797 S.W.2d at 529.
17. Hill v. John Chezik Imports, 869 F.2d 1122, 1123 (8th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Hill 1].






24. Id. at 529.
1991] 1095
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notice by receipt of the letter at her last known address.2 Thus, Hill filed
suit 15 days past the expiration of the Title VII ninety-day limitation
period?8 The district court dismissed Hill's federal claim as untimely.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although Title
VII's limitation period is subject to equitable tolling, that remedy should be
reserved for circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control. 8 In this case, the
court noted Hill could have informed the EEOC of her new address, and she
still had ample time to file suit when she actually learned that the Right to
Sue letter had been issued.29 The Eighth Circuit did not address the district
court's discretionary dismissal, without prejudice, of Hill's state-law claims
based on the loss of pendent jurisdiction. 0
On September 23, 1987, Hill received a separate Notice of Right to Sue
from the MHRC giving her ninety days to file suit under the Missouri Human
Rights Act (MHRA).3' Her state-law claims were filed in federal court as
part of the first lawsuit 84 days from the date of this notice. These claims
were refiled in state circuit court on June 21, 1988, four days after the
dismissal of the federal action.32 Although, two years and nineteen days had
elapsed from the date of the Notice of Right to Sue, disregarding the time that
the federal lawsuit was pending would reduce this period to only 87 days.3
The state court refused to toll the statute of limitations. It dismissed the
discrimination claim because the filing was not within ninety days of the
issuance of the MHRC's Notice of Right to Sue, and it held that all the tort
claims were preempted by the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the circuit
court's dismissal of the state-law discrimination claim. 35  The court of
appeals rejected Hill's contention-that the statute of limitation of the MHRA
was equitably tolled while her claim was pending in federal court, citing "well
25. Id.
26. The Title VII limitation period is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(1)
(1988).
27. Hill 1, 869 F.2d at 1123.
28. Id. at 1123-24 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398
(1982) (Title VII filing period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but is subject to
waiver and tolling when equity so requires)).
29. Id. at 1124.





35. Id. at 530.
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4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/6
PRESERVING PENDENT CLAIMS
settled" Missouri precedents holding that statutes of limitation may be tolled
only by specific exceptions enacted by the legislature.36
The court also found that Hill did not come within a judicially-created
"litigation exception" to statutes of limitation because the pendency of her
federal proceeding had not prevented her from filing a parallel suit in state
court.37 Rejecting Hill's arguments grounded on considerations of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness, the court suggested instead that her "state
action could have been pending, but stayed, until the outcome of the federal
action."38
Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the preemption by the Workers'
Compensation Act of Hill's tort claims against her employer, but reversed the
dismissal of her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against her
supervisor, holding that the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar a suit
against a co-employee for an intentional tort. 9
B. The General/Special Statute of Limitation Distinction
Missouri is one of a minority of states still observing the common law
distinction which holds that a "true" or "general" statute of limitation
"extinguishes only the right to enforce the remedy and not the substantive
right itself;" 40 however, a "special" statute of limitation-i.e., one contained
within a statute that creates a new right not existing at common
law-extinguishes the right itself, "the theory being that the lawmaking body
which has the power to create the right may affix the conditions under which
it is to be enforced .... ,41 In effect, although the cases themselves do not
use the term, in Missouri a special statute of limitation is equivalent to a
substantive limitation upon the right granted by the statute.
It is difficult to perceive an underlying rationale for the typically short
duration of special limitation periods and the inflexibility with which they are
treated in Missouri law. The state supreme court traced the genesis of the
36. Id. (citing Langendoerfer v. Hazel, 601 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
37. Id. at 529. This exception may be invoked by a plaintiff who has been
prevented from filing suit by the pendency of an earlier proceeding not "provoked,
induced, or promoted" by the plaintiff herself. Follmer's Mkt. v. Comprehensive
Accounting Sew., 608 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
38. Hill HI, 797 S.W.2d at 529.
39. Id. at 529-30 (citing Hollrah v. Freidrich, 634 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982)).
40. Fenton v. Citizens Sav. Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 874, 879 n.6 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
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distinction to the need to determine whether a forum's limitation statutes
would govern a specially limited statutory right created by a foreign
jurisdiction.42 More recently, one commentator concluded that
the multiplicity of limitation periods for different types of claims ha[s] little
to do with the realization of the articulated goals. Rather, the choice of a
particular limitation period for a cause of action is either arbitrary or the
result of legislative favoritism for certain parties and claims. 43
This disfavored status of special limitation periods was codified in
Missouri as early as 1835." The statute -has survived 146 years virtually
unchanged 5
C. Preclusion of Statutory and Constitutional Tolling
Chapter 516 contains Missouri's general statutes of limitation for
traditional common law actions such as fraud, breach of contract, real property
actions, professional malpractice, and so forth.46 It also lists the circumstanc-
es under which the general statutes of limitation may be tolled, including
among others disability of the plaintiff, absence of the defendant, fraud or
concealment of the cause of action, stay by injunction, and nonsuit of an
earlier action.47 Thus, the effect of section 516.300 is to deny the protection
of the statutory tolling provisions to legislative causes of action that were
unknown to the common law.
Since Civil War times, courts in Missouri have maintained that statutes
of limitation are favored in the law and that courts are powerless to expand
the exceptions prescribed by the legislature.48 In obedience to the restrictions
42. Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352 Mo. 1, 5, 175 S.W.2d 852, 854 (1943)
(quoting J. STORY, CONFLIcr OF LAWS, § 582 (1841)). The court did not pursue the
clear implication that this original purpose might not justify maintaining such a
distinction within the forum's own laws.
43. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes ofLimitations and Modern Choice ofLaw,
57 UMKC L. REv. 681, 688 (1989).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. Limitation, Art. III, § 10 (1835).
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.300 (1986) states: "Actions otherwise limited.-The
provisions of [Chapter 516, Statutes of Limitation] shall not extend to any action
which is or shall be otherwise limited by any statute; but such action shall be brought
within the time limited by such statute." Only four other states retain a similar statute:
HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-10 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-17 (1978); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-24 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 464 (1959).
46. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 516.010-.140 (1986).
47. Id. §§ 516.150-.370.
48. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Bragg, 135 Mo. 291, 300, 36 S.W. 600, 602
[Vol. 561098
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imposed by section 516.300, Missouri courts repeatedly have held that the
running of a special statute of limitation cannot be tolled due to a plaintiff's
disability, a defendant's fraud or concealment, or any other reason not
contained within the statute itself, even in cases of severe hardship.49
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, held that because a
civil rights ordinance creates a right not known to the common law, its
limitation period "must be strictly followed or ... the right itself is
(1896) (statutes of limitation are favored in the law, and party seeking to avoid them
must come strictly under some exception); Hoester v. Sammelmann, 101 Mo. 619, 624,
14 S.W. 728, 730 (1890) (courts cannot extend statutory exceptions to statutes of
limitation); Richardson v. Harrison, 36 Mo. 96, 100 (1865) (party must affirmatively
show an exception to the statute of limitation). But see Finney v. Estes, 9 Mo. 227,
229 (1845) (literal construction may give way to general principles of justice where
cause of action did not accrue until after statute of limitation had expired).
In later cases, Missouri courts have defeated statutory limitation periods under
narrowly defined circumstances. See, e.g., Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d
7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (limitation period for medical malpractice actions, as applied to
minors, violated their constitutional right to access to the courts); Knipmeyer v.
Spirtas, 750 S.W.2d 489,490 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Folimer's Mkt. v. Comprehensive
Accounting Serv., 608 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Ottenad v. Mount Hope
Cemetery & Mausoleum Co., 176 S.W.2d 62, 64-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (period of
limitation is tolled while a party is prevented from exercising a legal remedy by the
pendency of legal proceedings which were not "provoked, induced, or promoted" by
that party). It is noteworthy, however, that each of these cases involved a "general"
limitation period. The claim in Strahler was subject to the medical malpractice statute
of limitation: two years or until age twelve for minors under ten years of age. Mo.
REv. STAT. § 516.105 (1986). See Strahler, 706 S.W.2d at 8. The claims in
Knipmeyer and Follmer's Market were subject to the five-year statute of limitation for
contract actions. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (1986). See Knipmeyer, 750 S.W.2d at
490; Follmer's Market, 608 S.W.2d at 459. The claim in Ottenad was subject to the
ten-year limitation period for actions on an indebtedness. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.110
(1986). See Ottenad, 176 S.W.2d at 64.
49. See, e.g., White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 571,572 (Mo. 1989); DeRousse v. PPG
Indus., 598 S.W.2d 106, 111-12 (Mo. 1980); Forehead v. Hall, 355 S.W.2d 940, 946
(Mo. 1962); Black v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust, 321 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Mo.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 920 (1959); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Mo. 1958);
Woodruff v. Shores, 354 Mo. 742, 746-47, 190 S.W.2d 994, 996 (1945); State ex rel.
Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 509, 178 S.W.2d 347, 350 (1944); Wentz v. Price Candy
Co., 352 Mo. 1, 4, 175 S.W.2d 852, 854 (1943); Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 605,
41 S.W. 951, 954 (1897); Bregant ex rel. Bregant v. Fink, 724 S.W.2d 337, 338 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987); Langendoerfer v. Hazel, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Mayor's Comm'n on Human Rights, 572 S.W.2d 492,
493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974). 7
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extinguished."s Thus, because the MHRA is a civil rights statute that
contains its own limitation periods, 1 it comes within the restrictions of
section 516.300. The consequence of this characterization is that Hill's
MHRA-based discrimination claim could not be tolled by any mechanism
recognized by Missouri law.52
The Missouri Supreme Court recently held that neither the state
constitution's "open courts" guarantee 53 nor due process considerations
invalidated a ninety-day notice period (functionally akin to a special limitation
period) that is "rationally related to a legitimate legislative concern."' Thus,
the MHRA's ninety-day limitation period is presumed constitutionally valid,
so long as it can be found to have been prompted by a "legitimate legislative
concern.
155
D. Unavailability of the Saving Statute
Most states have enacted a "saving statute" that permits a plaintiff who
has suffered a "nonsuit" (generally, a dismissal of a timely filed lawsuit on
procedural grounds) to refile the dismissed lawsuit in state court, even after
the original period of limitation has run. 6 Most such statutes give the
50. Mayor's Comm'n, 572 S.W.2d at 493.
51. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111.1 (1986).
52. Presumably, this rule would also preclude application of the Follmer's Market
litigation exception considered by the court of appeals in Hill 11. See also supra notes
37 & 48. The litigation exception is partially codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.260
(1986) (time for bringing suit is tolled while the suit is stayed by injunction). This is
one of the tolling provisions disallowed for specially-limited claims by Mo. REV.
STAT. § 516.300 (1986).
53. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14 states: "[t]hat the courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or
character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay." For a case invalidating a general statute of limitation that violated this
constitutional provision, see Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo.
1986).
54. Findley v. City of Kansas City, 782 S.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Mo. 1990) (a
legitimate legislative choice to limit a city's liability validates the "harsh result" to
persons who lose their claim for relief).
55. To illustrate, the legislative concern in Findley was a desire to limit liability
claims against a municipality. Id. "
56. Forty-two states and Puerto Rico have enacted saving or tolling statutes
applicable to claims originally filed in federal court: ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(p) (Supp.
1990); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.240 (Supp. 1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-504
(Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-56-126 (1987); CALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE § 355
(West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
1100 [Vol. 56
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plaintiff an additional period to refile, typically six months to a year,57
commencing on the date of the dismissal or its affirmance on appeal.58
§ 52-592 (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8118 (1,974); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-2-61 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO CODE § 5-233 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 110, para.
13-217 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-8 (Bums 1986); IowA CODE
§ 614.10 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-518 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.270
(Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1972); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3462 (West Supp. 1991); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 855 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 32 (West
Supp. 1991); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5856 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 541.18 (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-69 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-2-407 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.340 (Michie 1987); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508:10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-28 (West 1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L.
& R. § 205 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 41(a) (1990); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-28 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Anderson 1991);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 100 (West 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.220 (1989); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5103(b) (Purdon Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-90
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 15-2-32 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 28-1-105 (Supp. 1990); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.064 (Vernon
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-40 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229.E (1950);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.240 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-18 (Supp. 1991);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (West 1983); WYo. STAT. § 1-3-118 (1977); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 31, §5303 (1991).
Three states and the District of Columbia have no saving statute. See D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-301 to 12-311 (1989 and Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051(2)
(West Supp. 1991); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 5-201 to 5-205 (1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-201 to 25-225 (1943).
The remaining five states (Hawaii, Missouri, New Mexico, Rhode Island and
Vermont) retain the prohibition on tolling for special limitations. See supra note 45.
57. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 432 n.9, 11 (1965).
58. See, e.g., Carton v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 295 Ark. 126, 128-29, 747 S.W.2d
93, 94 (1988) (two successive nonsuits in federal court preserved plaintiff's right to
refile in state court within one year of latest nonsuit); Howmet Corp. v. City of
Wilmington, 285 A.2d 423, 427 (Del, Super. Ct. 1971) (dismissal by federal court for
lack of maritime jurisdiction came within terms of state saving statute giving plaintiff
one year to refile); Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 128 II. 2d 314, 320, 538 N.E.2d
553, 556 (1989) (one-year period for refiling under Illinois saving statute ran from the
date of dismissal by federal district court for lack of jurisdiction, not from date of
affirmance of the dismissal); Kleinberger v. Town of Sharon, 116 A.D.2d 367, 370,
501 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (1986) (dismissal of pendent state claims because of
insubstantial federal claims triggered saving statute affording plaintiff six months to
refile); Bockweg v. Anderson, 96 N.C. App. 660, 661-62, 387 S.E.2d 59, 60 (1990)
(one-year saving provision was triggered by voluntary dismissal specifically granted
by federal court under North Carolina rules); Pearson v. Duck, No. 89-C-33 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 2, 1990) (LEXIS, State Library, Ohio file) (dismissal without prejudice of
pendent state claims by federal court allows plaintiff one year to refile); Hatley v.
1101
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Other statutes toll the original limitation period while a suit is pending
between the parties. 9 State saving statutes may also permit the filing of a
new action in federal court after expiration of a state limitation period.6
Missouri's saving statute allows a plaintiff in a timely filed action who
suffers a nonsuit, or a reversal on appeal, to refile the claim in state court
within one year of the nonsuit or reversal. 61 This statute, however, applies
only to claims subject to the general statutes of limitation found in Chapter
516. Specially-limited claims are excluded by section 516.3007
Therein lies the heart of Hill's dilemma: On the one hand, her state suit
failed both limitation periods imposed by the MHRA9 because she filed it
almost eight months after the Notice of Right to Sue was issued, and two
Truck Ins. Exch., 261 Or. 606, 494 P.2d 426, 429 (1981) (action dismissed by federal
court for lack of diversity comes within saving statute giving plaintiff one year to
refile).
59. See, e.g., LaFargue v. St. Amant, 433 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1982),
writ denied, 435 So. 2d 427 (1983) (dismissal by federal court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction interrupted prescription); Darin v. Haven, 175 Mich. App. 144, 151-
52, 437 N.W.2d 349, 352 (1989) (period of limitation on pendent state claims not
adjudicated on the merits was tolled through appeal of the federal action); Roberts v.
City of Troy, 170 Mich. App. 567, 582, 429 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1988) (same).
60. See, e.g., Griffen v. Big Spring Indep. School Dist., 706 F.2d 645, 651-52 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983) (dismissal by state court for failure to satisfy
jurisdictional prerequisites preserved federal section 1983 action to vindicate the same
rights under Texas "wrong court" statute); Ullom v. Midland Indus., 663 F. Supp. 491,
493 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (federal diversity suit filed in Indiana within five years of
dismissal by Ohio state court for lack of personal jurisdiction was timely under
Indiana's "Journey's Account Statute").
61. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.230 (1986). If the balance of the original limitation
period is longer than one year, the saving statute will not be applied to shorten the
time for filing suit. St. Louis Univ. Hosp. v. Belleville, 752 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988).
62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.300 (1986). Missouri was one of only six states
(along with Alabama, Hawaii, Maryland, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania) found by the
Supreme Court to have no applicable saving or transfer statute that would preserve a
federal suit timely filed in state court and later dismissed for improper venue-a factor
in the Court's decision in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 433 n.12
(1965), to permit equitable tolling of the Federal Employers' Liability Act under such
circumstances.
63. The MHRA's limitation provision states as follows:
Any action brought in court under this section shall be filed within ninety
days from the date of the commission's notification letter to the individual
but no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred or its reasonable
discovery by the alleged injured party.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.111.1 (1986) (emphasis added).
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years and nineteen days after she was fired. On the other hand, she could not
invoke the one-year saving provision because it does not apply to specially-
limited claims. Therefore, her only remaining option was to plead for a
change in Missouri limitation doctrine that would permit equitable tolling of
her discrimination claim during the time it was properly filed and pending in
federal court.
E. Rejection of Equitable Tolling
Following California's lead, a number of states have adopted a judicial
doctrine of "equitable tolling" which, in the absence of an applicable saving
statute, preserves state-law claims that have expired during the pendency of
prior litigation.64 Equitable tolling applies when an injured party reasonably
and in good faith chooses to pursue one of several available legal remedies.
It consists of a three-pronged test: (1) timely notice to the defendant by the
filing of the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant in gathering
evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and
reasonable conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim.65
The doctrine can be traced to a 1922 Supreme Court decision by Justice
Holmes, which held that when a defendant has notice that the plaintiff is
trying to enforce a claim, "the reasons for the statute of limitations do not
exist .... "' The Supreme Court has since made equitable tolling applicable
to all federal statutes of limitation.67
64. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1989); Hosogai v.
Kadota, 145 Ariz. 227, 700 P.2d 1327 (1985); Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 917, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1983); Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81 (1974); Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 105 Ill. 2d
166, 473 N.E.2d 921 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1070 (1985); Torres v. Parkview
Foods, 468 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Harrison v. Chance, 244 Mont. 215, 228,
797 P.2d 200, 208 (1990); Galligan v. Westfield Centre Serv., 88 N.J. 188, 412 A.2d
922 (1980).
65. Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 924, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
66. New York Cent. R.R. v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (permitting an
amendment to plaintiff's complaint after expiration of the statute of limitation, under
doctrine now known as "relation back").
67. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,397 (1946) ("equitable doctrine is read
into every federal statute of limitation"). See also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455
U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (Title VII filing period is subject to waiver and equitable tolling);
Bumett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965) (finding that Congress did
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A few states have declined to adopt equitable tolling. Hawaii does not
recognize the doctrine and construes its statutes of limitation very strictly.'
The Eighth Circuit has refused to apply equitable tolling to claims grounded
in Minnesota law "because Minnesota courts have repeatedly rejected it."69
Pennsylvania courts also do not recognize equitable tolling;70 however, state
law makes an exception for federal cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.7
The District of Columbia reluctantly held itself bound by an earlier decision
rejecting an argument "functionally identical" to equitable tolling,72 although
two of the three division members believed the issue was worthy of en banc
consideration.73
Missouri law, as noted earlier, contains formidable doctrinal barriers to
the adoption of equitable tolling, particularly in the case of special statutes of
limitation. 7' The Missouri Court of Appeals recognized those barriers in
affirming the dismissal of Hill's discrimination claim. After acknowledging
that "there is authority in other jurisdictions to support [Hill's] contentions,"
the court rejected her "policy arguments" favoring an outright acceptance of
equitable tolling.75 The court noted that "Missouri law is well settled as to
when a statute of limitations is tolled" and reiterated the need for strict
compliance with specific statutory exceptions. 6
The court of appeals extended those same arguments to rebuff Hill's
attempt to justify the specific application of equitable tolling to her discrimina-
tion claim through legislative intent analysis/ 7 In fact, the Missouri General
68. C & W Constr. v. Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 687 F. Supp. 1453,
1460-61 (D. Haw. 1988).
69. Rogers v. Furlow, 729 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D. Minn. 1989) (citing Lambrecht
v. Ford Motor Co., 729 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1984), which does not cite supporting
Minnesota cases).
70. Royal-Globe Ins. Co. v. Hauck Mfg. Co., 233 Pa. Super. 248, 252-53, 335
A.2d 460, 462 (1975).
71. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5103(b) (Purdon Supp. 1990); see Williams v.
F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 Pa. Super. 511, 514-15, 577 A.2d 907, 909 (1990).
72. Bond v. Serano, 566 A.2d 47 (D.C. 1989) (citing Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217
A.2d 109, 113 (D.C. 1966)).
73. Id. at 49. The third judge, however, vehemently rejected individualized
equitable scrutiny of plaintiff filing errors, arguing that it would defeat the legislative
purpose expressed in limitation statutes, would demand time-consuming and inequitable
determinations, and would result in prejudice to defendants. Id. at 54-57 (Farrell, J.,
concurring).
74. No state that recognizes the general/special limitation distinction has accepted
equitable tolling. See sources cited supra notes 45, 64.
75. Hill 11, 797 S.W.2d at 530-31.
76. Id. at 530.
77. Id. See Comment, Equitable Tolling of Statutory Benefit Time Limitations:
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Assembly has invited legislative intent analysis by directing that the MHRA
"shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof" and that "any law
inconsistent with any provision of [the MHRA] shall not apply." 78 The
MHRA limitation provision itself contains an equitable tolling exception."
Further, the Missouri Supreme Court has characterized the MHRA as a
remedial statute that is to be "liberally construed in line with its purpose."
80
Thus, Missouri's special limitation doctrine could conceivably accommo-
date equitable tolling of the MHRA's limitation periods, in keeping with the
express legislative purpose of the statute itself and the state supreme court's
interpretation.81 If equitable tolling is read into the statute that creates a
specially-limited claim, then its application to that claim does not violate the
strict letter of section 516.300, which merely requires that the claim be
brought within the time limited in the statute itself. The Hill I1 court was
unwilling to take this step. The new supplemental jurisdiction statute makes
it unnecessary-but only if the claim is first filed in federal court.
III. THE STATUTE
A. Pendent Jurisdiction before the 1990 Act
The modern source of the supplemental jurisdiction82 of federal courts
over pendent state-law claims is United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.83 The Gibbs
test gave federal courts jurisdiction over an entire action whenever the federal-
A Congressional Intent Analysis, 64 WASH. L. REV. 681, 686-87 (1989).
78. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.101 (1986).
79. The MHRA's two-year limitation period runs from the occurrence of the
alleged cause "or its reasonable discovery by the alleged injured party." Id.
§ 213.111.1.
80. Midstate Oil v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 849
(Mo. 1984).
81. In 1943, the Missouri Supreme Court used this approach to conclude that the
rule regarding special statutes of limitation should not be applied where "the effect
would be to defeat the clear intent of the legislature." Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352
Mo. 1, 4, 175 S.W.2d 852, 855 (1943) (concluding that the statute of limitation in the
Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act was not intended by the legislature to be a
jurisdictional time limit). Wentz was overruled by 1980 statutory amendment. See
Foreman v. Shelter Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1986). It must be noted, however,
that the Wentz reasoning has not been followed in later decisions of the Missouri
Supreme Court. See supra note 49 for a list of relevant decisions of the Missouri
Supreme Court.
82. See supra note 14 for definitions of supplemental, pendent, and ancillary
jurisdiction.
83. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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law and state-law claims derived from a "common nucleus of operative fact"
and ordinarily would be expected to be tried in a single proceeding." This
"doctrine of discretion" permitted federal courts to decline pendent jurisdic-
tion, by dismissing the action without prejudice, whenever the factors of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity indicated that a case
properly belonged in state court-as when all the federal-law claims had
dropped out of the lawsuit.85
In affirming the power of federal courts to remand a previously-removed
case back to state court, as an alternative to outright dismissal, the Supreme
Court in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill expressly acted to protect
plaintiffs whose state-law claims would otherwise be barred by the expiration
of a statute of limitation during the pendency of the federal action.87 The
Court feared that requiring the dismissal of removed cases would discourage
plaintiffs from joining relatively weak federal-law claims to their state-law
claims because the combination of removal, subsequent dismissal, and
expiration might bar the state-law claims altogether.rs
Hill II vindicated the Supreme Court's concern over the loss of timely
filed state-law causes of action after a trip through the federal courts. A
plaintiff who had timely acted to protect her rights in a court of competent
jurisdiction was penalized for a discretionary decision of the federal court,
over which she had no control.89 The solution crafted by the Court in Cohill
would not help in this instance, because in the absence of congressional
authority th6 federal courts could not "remand" to the state court system a case
that had not yet been filed there.
The Supreme Court does not encourage the retention of expired pendent
claims by federal courts.9 Nevertheless, many district courts have given
consideration to the availability of a saving statute when determining whether
84. Id. at 725. These parameters are derived from article III of the Constitution,
which requires a "justiciable case or controversy" as a condition of federal court
jurisdiction. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2., cl. 1). Similarly, section 1367
demands that the jurisdictionally sufficient claims and the supplemental claims "form
part of the same case or controversy under article III of the United States Constitu-
tion." Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (104 Stat.) 5089, 5113.
85. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
86. 484 U.S. 343 (1987).
87. "This consequence may work injustice to the plaintiff: although he has
brought his suit in timely manner, he is time-barred from pressing his case." Id. at
351-52.
88. Id. at 352 n.9.
89. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
90. See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 352-53 n.10.
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to dismiss such claims.91 But the district court in Hill I apparently did not
consider this factor in dismissing Hill's federal suit, and the issue was not
brought up on appeal before the Eighth Circuit.' After Hill II, the federal
district courts sitting in Missouri might have been reluctant to dismiss time-
barred pendent claims. Alternatively, they might have refused from the outset
to exercise jurisdiction over pendent claims likely to expire during the
pendency of a federal lawsuit.
Under Hill 11, Missouri plaintiffs with parallel federal and specially-
limited state claims were left to choose among abandoning a weak federal
claim, forgoing the federal forum, or filing two separate lawsuits. The latter
option, suggested by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Hill II,9' would
impose an intolerable burden on plaintiffs seeking to enforce a federal right:
[Forcing a plaintiff to litigate his or her case in both federal and state
courts impairs the ability of the federal court to grant full relief.., and
'imparts a fundamental bias against utilization of the federal forum owing
to the deterrent effect imposed by the needless requirement of duplicate
litigation.' 9
4
None of the alternatives listed above was entirely satisfactory to either the
plaintiffs or the federal courts stuck with expired pendent claims. Congress'
elegant solution was the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction
statute.
B. Pendent Jurisdiction under the 1990 Act
In October 1990, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Study Committee
Implementation Act of 1990 (Act). 5 The Act implemented the "noncontro-
versial" recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee, established
by Congress to recommend improvements to the federal court system. These
91. See, e.g., Huffinain v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 1989); Helman v.
Murry's Steaks, 743 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D. Del. 1990); Baez v. American Cyanamid
Co., 685 F. Supp. 303, 309 (D.P.R. 1988); Waldrop v. Evans, 681 F. Supp. 840, 860
(M.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989); O'Neal v. DeKalb County,
667 F. Supp. 853, 859 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aft'd, 850 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1988);
McCracken v. City of Chinook, 652 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (D. Mont. 1987); Grant v.
ARA Serv., 626 F. Supp. 66, 71 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
92. Hill I, 869 F.2d 1122.
93. Hill 11, 797 S.W.2d at 530.
94. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,576-77 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
95. This Act was Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114.
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recommendations included proposals to reform the federal courts' workload,
structure and administration, and to reform the relationship between the state
and federal court systems. 96
In accordance with the Committee's recommendation, section 310 of the
Act?7 codified the supplemental jurisdiction of federal courts, essentially by
96. H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6802, 6861. Among the other recommendations
enacted by Congress are modifications of the venue and removal statutes, and the
creation of a general four-year statute of limitation that will apply by default to federal
rights created after the effective date of the Act. Mengler, supra note 14, at 213 n.2.
One of the apparently controversial (because not enacted) recommendations was the
abolishment of diversity jurisdiction, with exceptions made only for complex litigation
and supplemental claims. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION 38-
48 (April 2, 1990).
97. This section will be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and will state:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder
or inteivention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts
shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be
joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over a claim under subsection (a) if-
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection
(a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed
at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a),
shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after
1108 [Vol. 56
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affirming the doctrines of pendent claim and ancillary-claim jurisdiction as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gibbs98 and its progeny. In addition,
this section filled a gap in the jurisdictional authority of the federal courts by
expressly granting them the power to hear pendent party claims, 9 thus
overruling Finley v. United States."'
Section 1367(d) tolls the limitation period of any supplemental claims
dismissed when the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion, together with the limitation period of any other claims in the same action
voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff thereafter. All such claims are tolled
while they are pending in federal court and for thirty days after their
dismissal, unless state law provides for a longer tolling period.' 1 The utility
of this provision is succinctly explained in the legislative history:
The purpose is to prevent the loss of claims to statutes of limitations where
state law might fail to toll the running of the period of limitations while a
supplemental claim was pending in federal court. It also eliminates a
possible disincentive from such a gap in tolling when a plaintiff might wish
to seek voluntary dismissal of other claims in order to pursue an entire
matter in state court when a federal court dismisses a supplemental
claim. 102
Thus, the tolling provision is designed to correct the situation envisioned
by the Supreme Court in Cohill"'3 and presented in Missouri by Hill II. The
statute, however, comes four years too late to help Hill: it applies to civil
it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States.
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14, reprinted in 150 CONG. REC. H13,304
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
98. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
99. See Mengler, supra note 14, at 213-15.
100. 490 U.S. 595 (1989).
101. This tolling period matches that of the state having the shortest saving statute
(Wisconsin). Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(3) (West 1983). Accordingly, the statute will
have no effect on most of the 42 states that already permit saving or tolling of pendent
claims. See supra note 56. There may be instances of minor extensions of time in
those states, such as Louisiana and Michigan, which merely toll the statute of
limitation while the claim is pending in the earlier proceeding. See supra note 59.
102. H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 6802, 6876.
103. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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actions commenced in federal court on or after December 1, 1990, the
effective date of the Act."M
C. Federal Preemption of State Law
The source of Congress' power to preempt state law is the supremacy
clause contained in article VI of the constitution. 5 State law is preempted
by the existence of (1) explicit preemptive language in the federal statute; (2)
a pervasive scheme of federal regulation evidencing congressional intent to
occupy an entire field; or (3) an actual conflict with federal law, as when
compliance with both federal and state law is impossible, or when state law
stands as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress.06 The power granted
to the federal government by the supremacy clause is complemented by and
in tension with the rights guaranteed to the states and the people by the tenth
amendment.107
The language of section 1367(d) leaves no doubt that Congress intended
to supersede state law where necessary to preserve expired supplemental
claims: "The period of limitations ... shall be tolled ... unless State law
provides for a longer tolling period." ' In the ordinary case, that determina-
tion of congressional intent would end the inquiry;1 9 however, because this
particular statute purports to preserve the right to enforce state-created rights
in the state courts, a closer examination is in order. In this regard the
Supreme Court stated
104. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(c), 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (1990).
105. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
106.. English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990).
107. The tenth amendment states as follows: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
108. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14, reprinted in 150 CONG. REC.
H13,304 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (emphasis added).
109. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (footnote omitted) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
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[flederal law is enforceable in state courts ... because the Constitu-
tion and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws
passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause makes those laws
"the supreme Law of the Land," and charges state courts with a coordinate
responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of
procedure.1
0
Accordingly, state courts may not refuse to enforce a federal right
without a "valid excuse.""' A violation of or disagreement with federal law
does not constitute such an excuse."' Thus, the Supreme Court has found
federal preemption of procedural rules that would produce different outcomes
for federal-question litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in
state or federal court.
13
Similarly, the Court has held that the Supremacy Clause is violated by
a pretextual ouster of jurisdiction, such as when state law prevents a court of
general jurisdiction, which is otherwise competent to hear similar types of
actions grounded in state law, from adjudicating a substantive federal
right."' States cannot evade the Supremacy Clause simply by removing
jurisdiction to hear the federal action from otherwise competent courts. The
fact that a state rule is denominated "jurisdictional" is irrelevant "if the rule
110. Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2438 (1990) (emphasis
added).
111. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2439.
112. Id. at 2440.
113. Id. at 2442-44; Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1987) (although a state
may establish rules of procedure for its courts, those rules may not be outcome-
determinative for federal rights based solely on whether they are asserted in state or
federal court); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1979) (state law may not
immunize parties subject to § 1983 liability under federal law); cf. Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1987) (in the context of Erie jurisprudence, the goal
is "to establish.., substantial uniformity of predictable outcome" between cases tried
in federal and state court).
114. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2444-45; Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-61 (1981) (state commission had jurisdiction to
entertain claims analogous to those granted by federal law); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386, 394 (1946) (state courts had adequate jurisdiction under established local law to
adjudicate federal action where they would enforce the same type of claim arising
under state law); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56-59 (1911)
(Federal Employers' Liability Act may be enforced as of right in state courts whose
jurisdiction is appropriate to the occasion); cf Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-
37 (1872) (the state and federal courts together form one system of jurisprudence, and
are not foreign to each other but belong to the same country).
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does not reflect the concerns of power over the person and competence over
the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to protect."'1 5
But the Supreme Court treads lightly when a state court declines
jurisdiction because of a "neutral" rule of judicial administration-i.e., one that
does not discriminate against federal causes of action. 6 The reason is the
traditionally "great latitude" possessed by states to "establish the structure and
jurisdiction of their own courts."117
Thus, the Supreme Court has excused a refusal of jurisdiction on three
occasions: (1) where a state statute permitted dismissal of both federal and
state claims when all the parties were nonresidents; (2) where a municipal
court (a court of limited jurisdiction) was found to be without power to hear
a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) claim arising outside its territory;
and (3) where a state was found to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens
impartially so as to not discriminate against FELA suits.'
D. Preemption by the Tolling Provision
The three cases noted above contain several common threads. First, the
disputed issue in each case was an attempt to enforce a substantive federal
right in an unwilling state court. It is not immediately apparent, however,
whether section 1367(d) does create a substantive federal right. The scant
legislative history on the point suggests that Congress was concerned with
eliminating disincentives to the use of federal courts by plaintiffs.'19
Perhaps such plaintiffs have been granted an expectation that using the federal
courts will not result in the loss of parallel state causes of action. If so, this
"right" is qualitatively different from other substantive federal rights, in that
it can only be enforced by maintaining an action in state court. This is a
second point of departure from prior cases. A third difference is that none of
the cases cited involved an outright attempt by Congress to create jurisdiction
in contravention of state law."'
On the other hand, some factors mitigate in favor of allowing Missouri
courts to refuse jurisdiction. Section 516.300 is unquestionably a "neutral"
115. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2445-46.
116. Id. at 2440-42.
117. Id. at 2441.
118. Id. at 2442 (citing, respectively, Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
279 U.S. 377 (1929); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Missouri ex rel. Southern
R.R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950)).
119. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
120. In fact, prior cases emphasize that states cannot be required to create a court
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rule of judicial administration that extinguishes the subject matter jurisdiction
of Missouri courts to hear specially-limited claims. The state statute antedates
the federal one by nearly a century-and-a-half, and it has been applied
impartially to cases filed in both state and federal courts.'
Further, Missouri cases make it clear that section 516.300 is a true
jurisdictional limitation on the power of Missouri courts to decide specially-
limited claims, 2 one that "reflects the concerns of power ... over the
subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to protect."" 3 Thus, all
of the factors that in the past have led the Supreme Court to excuse a refusal
of jurisdiction are present in the facts of Hill 11.1'
As the above discussion suggests, the fact that the tolling provision is a
mandate to state courts rather than an independent grant of an individual right
turns the reasoning used by the Court in prior cases inside out. But the
incontrovertible fact remains that Congress acted expressly to preempt state
law, to preserve claims that would otherwise be lost, to promote free access
to the federal court system, and perhaps also to relieve plaintiffs of the burden
of duplicative filings.'2' Further, congressional action under the Supremacy
Clause carries a strong presumption of validity.126
In addition, the Full Faith and Credit Clause obligates states to enforce
a judgment recovered in another state that they might not have entertained as
an original cause of action.' 27 States can do no less under the Supremacy
Clause." Accordingly, Supremacy Clause jurisprudence will likely stretch
to accommodate the imposition of the tolling provision on Missouri courts.
121. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1988) itself would produce outcome-
determinative results based solely on whether the plaintiff first filed suit in federal
court. Plaintiffs who suffered a nonsuit in state court would not be allowed to refile
after the expiration of a special statute of limitation, whereas plaintiffs who suffered
a nonsuit in federal court could refile under section 1367(d). On the other hand,
because the section 1367(d) "right" does not arise at all unless the plaintiff files suit
in federal court, perhaps the plight of the state plaintiff is not a proper concern for a
federal court determining the constitutionality of the tolling provision.
122. "[W]here a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction arises solely by statutory
creation, absent conformity with the statute, no such jurisdiction exists in the trial
court." American Indus. Resources v. T.S.E. Supply Co., 708 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986).
123. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2445-46.
124. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 93 & 101.
126. Cf. supra note 109.
127. Howlett, 110 S. Ct. at 2446 n.26 (citing McKnett v. St. Louis & San
Francisco R.R., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934)).
128. Id. at 2446.
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There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered
the issues raised by preemption in this context. 29 Section 1367(d) is not
found in the Report of the Federal Courts Study Commission, which forms the
basis of the Federal Courts Act." Its source is a 1969 American Law
Institute study of state and federal jurisdiction."'
This study concluded that directing a state court to entertain a cause
barred by the state's own law would not constitute an "invalid exercise of
federal power.",32 This conclusion was grounded on an analysis of Claflin
and Testa, and drew an analogy to the removal statute,3  which de-
prives state courts of jurisdiction even of a non-removable case until and
unless the issue is decided and the case is remanded by the federal court . 35
This analogy, however, is not quite on point in that section 1367(d) tends to
grant jurisdiction to, not remove jurisdiction from, a state court.
E. Compliance with the Tolling Provision
In the event that section 1367(d) preempts Missouri's special limitation
doctrine, the question becomes how the state courts may comply with the
federal mandate in the absence of a conforming legislative amendment to
section 516.300.
A recent decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is instructive. That
court found itself trapped between the defendants' federal right to interlocuto-
ry appeal of an order denying their request for qualified immunity, and a state
statute barring the court from considering the interlocutory appeal. 36 The
court concluded that "[t]he Supremacy Clause does not create jurisdiction in
a state appellate court where none otherwise exists."137 It then determined
129. See H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (104 Stat.) 6802, 6876.
130. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 47-48, 556-68
(April 2, 1990).
131. A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 65, § 1386(be) (1969). Interestingly, § 1386 recommended a
parallel thirty-day tolling provision for exclusive federal claims mistakenly filed in
state court. Id. at 65. The stated purpose was to deprive defendants of an incentive
to delay raising jurisdictional complaints until after expiration of the cause of action.
Id. at 373-74.
132. Id. at 453 (Memorandum E).
133. See supra note 113.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1948).
135. A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 455-57 (1969).
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that the order denying qualified immunity is reviewable on the merits prior to
trial "by an original action in this court properly presenting the claim."1 38
Thus, the court found that it could not entertain an appeal from the order of
the trial court, but it could, and must, hear an action demanding review of the
order of the trial court. 3
9
In Missouri, the corresponding conflicting demands are an express federal
mandate to the state courts to hear a particular class of claims, versus a state
statute and decisional law holding that the courts have no subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims. Applying the Oklahoma rule, plaintiffs would
need to file an action in state court demanding that the court enforce their
substantive federal right. But that federal right, if one has been created by
section 1367(d), itself consists of the right to file an action in state court.
Thus the analysis leads to the absurd situation in which a plaintiff with
an expired, specially-limited, dismissed pendent claim might need to file an
original proceeding in state court to enforce her federally-created right to have
the state court entertain an original proceeding on that same claim, which was
created and extinguished by state law but revived by federal law.
A much cleaner solution is the legislative modification of section 516.300
so that the protection of the one-year saving statute is extended to all
specially-limited state-law claims.140 This action would not only obviate the
need for the potentially tortuous process of establishing the constitutionality
of the tolling provision, but it would also extend the equal protection of the
law to all holders of specially-limited claims in the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Hill II left Missouri plaintiffs who held parallel federal
and specially-limited pendent claims with unpleasant choices. Their state-law
claims were subject to discretionary dismissal by the federal courts and would
not be preserved by state law if they expired during the pendency of a federal
suit. Plaintiffs in this situation were forced to choose among filing a
protective duplicate suit in state court at the outset of litigation; forgoing the
federal forum for resolution of their federal-law claims; or abandoning one set
of claims entirely.
Federal district courts sitting in Missouri also were faced with the certain
knowledge that a class of expired pendent claims would be .lost to plaintiffs
138. Id. at 1040 (emphasis in original).
139. Id.
140. For example, the statute could read as follows: "The provisions of sections
516.101 to 516.220 and 516.240 to 516.370 shall not extend to any action which is or
shall be otherwise limited by any statute; but such action shall be brought within the
time limited by such statute." The saving statute is Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.230 (1986).
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if dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction. These courts might have felt
compelled to retain and decide expired state-law claims to compensate for the
absence of any state remedy; or they might have begun routinely refusing
pendent jurisdiction as a defensive tactic.
The supplemental jurisdiction tolling provision, enacted as part of the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, clarified the situation, at least for the
federal district courts in the state, which may now rely on clear-cut guidelines
for the dismissal of pendent claims. Holders of specially-limited claims,
however, will have no such assurances until the constitutionality of the new
statute is decided.
The tolling provision is likely to be upheld as a valid exercise of
Congress' preemptive power under the Supremacy Clause. Once its
constitutionality is settled, section 1367(d) will protect specially-limited claims
from sudden death by jurisdictional irregularity. The holders of such claims
surely will find it prudent to attach any federal claim that meets the minimum
relatedness and substantiality requirements to gain entry into the federal court
system.' These plaintiffs will take advantage of an "inverse Cohill"
situation in which state-law claims might be extended after a trip through the
federal courts. The "jurisdictional wager"'142 necessitated by current Missou-
ri limitation doctrine will become a sure bet for those fortunate plaintiffs with
a colorable federal question claim-either the federal court will resolve their
entire case, or their state-law claims will be released with a new life to be
refiled in state court.
The wholly undesired result might be an increase in the number of
federal court cases filed in Missouri, and in the other eight states that lack a
saving statute or deny it to specially-limited claims. 143 It is possible that a
141. But note the caveat in Gibbs:
[R]ecognition of a federal court's wide latitude to decide ancillary questions
of state law does not imply that it must tolerate a litigant's effort to impose
upon it what is in effect only a state law case. Once it appears that a state
claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only
an appendage, the state claim may fairly be dismissed.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). A federal court faced with
a frivolous federal claim might impose Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiff, his attorney,
or both. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
142. Bond v. Serano, 566 A.2d 47, 56 (D.C. 1989) (Farrell, J., concurring).
143. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (Title I of the Judicial Improvements
Act) and the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 (Title II of the Act), enacted concurrently
with the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act, were intended to
address the high costs and delays of civil litigation, and the lack of resources in the
federal courts. S. REP. No. 416, P.L. 101-650, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), reprinted
in 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6802, 6804. Any factor that tends to
increase the caseload of the federal courts runs counter to these goals.
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substantial number of plaintiffs whose claims would have been discouraged
or barred by the decision in Hill II now may avoid the strictures of Missouri
limitation doctrine by first filing suit in the federal court system.'
44
Uniformity can be restored simply by making the saving statute available
to all plaintiffs-whether they hold generally-limited or specially-limited
claims. In fact, since the doctrinal foundation for the distinction between
general and special limitations in Missouri law will begin to crumble once any
modification of the statute is undertaken, it should then become possible to
contemplate the outright repeal of section 516.300. Then all the protections
of the statutory tolling provisions may be extended equally to all claim
holders, regardless of the derivation of their respective causes of action.
ROSEL RODRIGUEZ PINE
144. To illustrate the range of claims potentially affected, a cursory review of the
Missouri statutes reveals special statutes of limitation for anti-trust actions (Mo. REV.
STAT. § 416.131 (1986)), collection of delinquent city taxes (id. §§ 92.720-.730),
actions for discriminatory denial of credit (id. § 314.115), wrongful death actions (id.
§ 537.100), actions for discriminatory housing practices (id. §§ 213.120, .127), actions
for excess interest on small loans (id. § 408.150), usury actions (id. § 408.030), and
equal pay for women actions (id. § 290.450). Any of these actions could be filed
pendent to a federal-law claim. A more comprehensive listing can be found in J.
DEVINE, MISSOURI CIVIL PLEADING AND PRAcIcE § 7-2 (1986).
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